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Abstract
We present our system submission to the ASVspoof 2019 Chal-
lenge Physical Access (PA) task. The objective for this chal-
lenge was to develop a countermeasure that identifies speech
audio as either bona fide or intercepted and replayed. The tar-
get prediction was a value indicating that a speech segment was
bona fide (positive values) or “spoofed” (negative values). Our
system used convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and a rep-
resentation of the speech audio that combined x-vector attack
embeddings with signal processing features. The x-vector at-
tack embeddings were created from mel-frequency cepstral co-
efficients (MFCCs) using a time-delay neural network (TDNN).
These embeddings jointly modeled 27 different environments
and 9 types of attacks from the labeled data. We also used
sub-band spectral centroid magnitude coefficients (SCMCs) as
features. We included an additive Gaussian noise layer during
training as a way to augment the data to make our system more
robust to previously unseen attack examples. We report system
performance using the tandem detection cost function (tDCF)
and equal error rate (EER). Our approach performed better that
both of the challenge baselines. Our technique suggests that our
x-vector attack embeddings can help regularize the CNN predic-
tions even when environments or attacks are more challenging.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, spoofing counter-
measures, speech replay detection
1. Introduction
Detecting replayed speech is a notoriously difficult task in
speech processing. In particular, an adversary might obtain a
snippet of recorded speech wherein the human target has used
their voice authentically, such as when speaking a passphrase.
When an automatic speaker verification (ASV) system is pre-
sented with fake speech intending to impersonate a live talker
then this is commonly referred to as either “spoofing”, a re-
play attack or a presentation attack. Building upon similar chal-
lenges from earlier years [1, 2, 3], detecting replay attacks was
the basis for the Physical Access (PA) task of the ASVspoof
2019 Challenge [4]. The aim of our work was to detect whether
or not a bona fide live speech recording had been intercepted
and subsequently replayed back as non-live speech to an ASV
system. There are numerous variables to be modeled including
elements of how the attack was conducted as well as the type
of ASV system being attacked. Our approach captured these
conditions using a convolutional neural network (CNN) archi-
tecture, similar to the top system from the earlier ASVspoof
2017 replay detection challenge [3]. We explored several types
of signal features such as those from [2] and our final submis-
sion was based on our own specially-trained x-vector [5] em-
beddings combined with signal features.
While there are many different kinds of speech spoofing at-
tacks, including voice conversion and text-to-speech [6, 7, 8, 9],
we have focused on replay attacks. Some work suggests
that speech replay clues are found in the time and frequency
domains [10]. Other work has explored energy-based fea-
tures [11, 12], attention-based adaptive filters [13], and con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) [14, 15]. It is particularly
challenging to model different types of acoustic environments,
playback devices, and recording devices [16]. Recent work has
also shown that high-frequency sub-bands in the acoustic sig-
nal contain evidence of replay. For example, Inverted Mel Fre-
quency Cepstral Coefficients (IMFCCs) consistently discrim-
inate speech replay across several frequency sub-bands [17].
IMFCCs come from inverting filters in the frequency domain
to capture more detail from higher frequencies. Other recent
work has shown that Sub-band Spectral Centroid Magnitude
Coefficients (SCMCs) are the best and most consistent signal
feature [2] across experiments, while the Constant-Q Cepstral
Coefficient (CQCC) features are also promising [18].
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we intro-
duce novel x-vector attack embeddings capturing the recording
conditions of an utterance (attack and environment variables).
Second, we analyze how well the x-vector embeddings model
factors of variation from different recording conditions. Finally,
we demonstrate that the combination of signal features and x-
vector embeddings out-performs all baselines for both metrics
on the ASVspoof 2019 development and evaluation datasets.
2. Feature Development
2.1. Speech Signal Features
Following from the features analysis for replay attack detec-
tion that was presented in [2] for the ASVspoof 2017 challenge,
we extracted the following features: Mel Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCCs), Inverted Mel Frequency Cepstral Co-
efficients (IMFCCs), Rectangular Filter Cepstral Coefficients
(RFCCs), Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (LFCCs),
Sub-band Spectral Centroid Magnitude Coefficients (SCMCs),
and Constant Q Cepstral Coefficients (CQCCs) [1]. A descrip-
tion of the features is provided in Table 1. We used static fea-
tures because preliminary experiments indicated that the dy-
namic features were not as useful in the spoofing task, espe-
cially the second-order features.
We used the IDIAP Bob.ap signal processing library to ex-
tract this set of signal processing features from speech audio
files [19, 20]. In the case of CQCCs, we used the code provided
by the challenge organizers and also described in [1]. For each
audio file, the feature extractor output is an NxM -dimensional
matrix with N as the number of coefficients and M as the du-
ration of the file in frames.
Each audio file in the ASVspoof 2019 dataset was of a dif-
ferent length. We pre-processed the extracted features to han-
dle this length variability and to create same-sized feature vec-
tors as input to our CNN classifier. We used a down-sampling
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Features Coeff. num. (N ) fmin − fmax (Hz)
MFCC 70 300-8000
IMFCC 60 200-8000
RFCC 30 200-8000
LFCC 70 100-7800
SCMC 40 100-8000
CQCC 50 15.62-8000
Table 1: Description of signal features extracted from the raw
speech audio. Note CQCC used a specific fmin from [1]
technique in the feature space. This means that for a given co-
efficient in a given audio file, we down-sampled the number
of frames to a constant. The technique preserved the original
per-coefficient distributions in a file while also setting the num-
ber of frames to a constant. For re-sampling we used the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) so that the spacing between the origi-
nal frames, s = δx, then became: s = δx ∗M/M ′. By doing
this, we set the number of down-sampled frames M ′ to a con-
stant where M ′ = 10. This effectively shortened the audio file
duration to 10 frames while preserving the mean and standard
deviation of each coefficient in a given file [21].
After this, our signal processing features were represented
as a Nx10-dim matrix. We selected M ′ = 10 frames based on
two motivations: 1) to reduce the overall size and overhead of
the dataset for later processing, and 2) to allow our countermea-
sures to operate on very short audio examples. We then stacked
the coefficients on a per-frame basis, in an effort to preserve
some temporal nature of the original signal. Finally, each of the
signal feature values were re-scaled to be between −1 and +1
using per-feature max values from the training set, applied later
to development and evaluation sets. We re-scaled the values in
order to align with our selection of activation function for the
regression task described in Section 3, which outputs a value
between −1 (spoofed) and +1 (authentic) .
2.2. X-vector Embedding Creation
In this work we also used x-vectors [5] as auxiliary features for
the CNN model described in Sec. 3. Our aim was to extract
meaningful fixed-size utterance-level vectors representing the
factors of variation, namely environment and attack conditions,
in the spoofing task. We used our extracted representations to
account for these factors in the final spoofing detection task.
This effort was to improve the system robustness to unseen con-
ditions by leveraging information about the environment and at-
tack classes from the labels provided for each training example.
The Kaldi Toolkit [22] was used to extract x-vectors repre-
senting a joint environment+attack class (which we refer to as
env+attack). The input features for the x-vector extractor were
40-dim MFCCs, with 80 filters in a filter bank. The x-vector ex-
tractor was a time-delay neural network (TDNN) with the same
architecture as in [5], i.e. seven layers with batch normalisa-
tion and ReLU activations. The x-vectors were extracted from
the sixth layer before the nonlinearity. Differently to the model
in [5] though, ours was not trained to classify speakers. The ex-
tractor was trained to differentiate between classes jointly rep-
resenting types of acoustic environments and types of attacks.
The joint env+attack classes were created by combining
each category label of variation for the simulated acoustic envi-
ronments and attack types, i.e. room size, T60 reverberation
time, talker-to-ASV distance, attacker-to-talker distance, and
replay device quality. From 10 attack type configurations, and
27 acoustic environment configurations (9 attacks plus authen-
tic speech), we created 270 env+attack classes. Training an x-
vector extractor to differentiate between env+attack classes en-
abled us to learn fixed-size representations, capturing both the
type of attack and the type of acoustic environment. The classi-
fication accuracy of our joint env+attack x-vectors was around
85% for 270 unique classes on a held-out validation set (10% of
training), hence these representations were meaningful.
After the x-vector extraction, we reduced the dimension-
ality of our x-vectors from 512-dim to 10-dim using Lin-
ear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). The LDA model also used
env+attack classes for training. We selected 10-dim based on
the EER from the development set. For 59,400 trials with non-
target proportion of 50%, the EER in the env+attack verification
task was 23.96% with the LDA backend.
2.3. X-vector Embedding Analysis
In this section we show an analysis of how the x-vector em-
beddings could differentiate between different types of attacks
and different types of environments. There are 27 environment
classes and 10 attack classes. It was easier to show the analysis
for environments and attacks separately, compared to modeling
all 270 classes for the jointly trained env+attack embeddings,
which are the ones ultimately used in our system.
Environment classification was an easier task (accuracy
86% on the validation set) than attack type classification (ac-
curacy 60% on the validation set), even though the number of
classes for classifying attacks was smaller than for classifying
environment. We hypothesize that this may be caused partly by
data imbalance in the case of attack recognition, compared to
the evenly distributed examples for the environment classes.
Figure 1: Confusion matrix for attack class predictions. The
scoring is based on the per attack mean development x-vectors
against per attack mean training x-vectors. Class 00 is the bona
fide class. For other labels, letters in the first position corre-
sponds to the attacker-to-talker distance (A - lowest, C - high-
est), letters in the second position corresponds to the replay de-
vice quality (A - the best, C - the worst).
To further investigate what the extracted x-vectors were
capturing, we analyzed the accuracy scores from predicting at-
tack and environment. Figure 1 shows a confusion matrix for
the scores for mean x-vectors per attack. First of all, it can be
observed that the replay device quality is well captured by the
x-vectors (labels with the same letter in the second position).
However, the attack-to-talker distance does not seem to be mod-
eled well with the attack x-vectors (e.g. scores for classes AC,
BC, and CC are very close to each other, but different than for
any other classes). The most evenly distributed scores can be
observed for the medium replay device quality classes (AB, BB,
CB). Our x-vector embeddings can detect when the replay de-
vice is very poor. However, if the replay device quality is near
perfect, it is much more difficult to develop the spoofing coun-
termeasures.
Figure 2: Confusion matrix for environment class predictions
using mean development x-vectors against mean training x-
vectors. Letters in the first position of the label ID correspond
to the room size (a - smallest, c - biggest). Letters in the second
position correspond to T60 reverberation time (a - shortest, c -
longest). Letters in the third position correspond to the talker-
to-ASV distance (a - shortest, c - longest).
Figure 2 shows the confusion matrix for how well the mean
x-vectors discriminate environment classes. Again, the talker-
to-ASV distance and the room size do not seem to be very well
captured (first and third letter position in labels). However,
the reverberation time (especially short and long) discriminates
classes well. Both spoofed and bona fide recordings were sim-
ulated in a variety of environments. So the idea was to extract
an embedding that would help to normalize out the effects of
recording in different environmental conditions, to be able to
generalize well to unseen conditions at test time.
We hypothesize that even though the x-vectors do not differ-
entiate very well between every attack and every environment
class, they do differentiate between some of them. Furthermore,
x-vector embeddings for similar acoustic conditions are close to
each other in the x-vector space. Therefore, these can be useful
representations complimenting our signal processing features.
2.4. Feature Combination
In our experiments, we explored several combinations of our
features while evaluating on the development set. For the
first case, we evaluated signal processing features individually.
Next, we evaluated x-vector embeddings individually. Finally,
we combined signal processing features with x-vector embed-
dings. Before concatenating the LDA x-vectors to the sig-
nal processing features, the LDA x-vectors were scaled with
c = 0.1 constant. We empirically found the scaling to have
a good effect on the final EER and tDCF metrics. Scaling x-
vectors before concatenation is conceptually similar to apply-
ing a fixed LDA-like transform in Kaldi (usually used when i-
vectors are concatenated to the input features for normalisation
in ASR), which is scaling down the dimensions that are “non-
informative”. This has the effect of encouraging stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) to ignore non-informative values. Scaled
and transformed env+attack x-vectors are denoted as xEAs in
our paper. They were concatenated to the signal processing fea-
tures at the input of the CNN model. We hypothesize that it
enabled us to normalize out some factors of variation, subse-
quently enabling the CNN model to learn more robust represen-
tations for the final countermeasure task.
Our system submission to the ASVspoof 2019 Challenge
was based on two features: SCMC signal features concatenated
with the xEAs vectors (scaled and transformed as described
above). For the submission, our dataset consisted of 54,000
training instances and 29,700 development instances. Our train-
ing data was therefore of size (54000, 410). These dimensions
were based on 40 SCMC coefficients by 10 frames per coef-
ficient, plus the additional 10-dimension x-vectors. The two
features were combined via concatenation. In each of the train-
ing and development sets, we found 5,400 instances had been
labeled as bona fide while the remaining had been labeled as
spoof, thus the dataset was very imbalanced for the two targets.
3. System Architecture
Our system1 was implemented with the Keras library [23] with
TensorFlow backend [24]. We designed our system to perform
regression. To do this we converted categorical target labels
to numerical values as follows: “spoof” became −1 and “bona
fide” became +1. Since we used the hyperbolic tangent acti-
vation function, the output of our system was therefore a value
between −1 and +1. The challenge evaluation plan called for
values with greater negative magnitude to correspond to the
“spoof” class while values with greater positive value to cor-
respond to the “bona fide” class. Thus we intentionally set up
the problem as a regression task. Our system output could be
interpreted to represent the degree of authenticity of the audio
especially considering that the countermeasures output by our
system were later evaluated in tandem with an ASV system.
Figure 3: Overview of our machine learning system architec-
ture. Scaled LDA x-vectors (xEAs) were concatenated to the
signal processing features (SCMCs). The DNN was a 3-layer
convolutional neural network.
1https://github.com/rhoposit/
ASVchallenge2019.git
3.1. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
Figure 3 shows an overview of our system architecture. The
first layer of our CNN was an additive Gaussian noise layer [25,
26, 27]. We used this as a form of data augmentation to help
the model generalize to unseen conditions. We determined the
placement of this layer experimentally and also tried different
values for the standard deviation of the noise distribution, fi-
nally deciding on nstd = 0.001. The next layer was a batch
normalization layer. The CNN consisted of 3 Conv1D layers.
The kernel size was set to 3 and we used 32 convolutional fil-
ters. Each Conv1D layer included a L2 regularizer [28]. Each
Conv1d layer was followed by a max pooling layer with pool
size and stride set to 2. Finally, we used a fully connected
layer with a single output and the hypoerbolic tangent activa-
tion function (tanh) [29]. The activation function had the effect
of restricting the output between −1 and 1.
3.2. System Training
We trained our model using a 10% subset of the training set
as a validation set. During training we swept several differ-
ent parameters. We explored values for standard deviation in
the Gaussian additive noise layer, in the range of: [0.000001,
0.00001, 0.00005, 0.0001, 0.001]. We also explored incremen-
tal values for L2 regularization between [0.00001, 0.001]. For
training, we measured loss using mean-squared-error (MSE).
We used early-stopping [30], and monitored validation loss with
change delta = 0 and patience p = 5 epochs. We used the
Adam optimizer [31] with learning rate lr = 0.001 and re-
maining parameters set as default.
4. Results and Discussion
Our system was evaluated using two related metrics. The pri-
mary metric was the tandem detection cost function (tDCF)
computed in conjunction with an ASV system that was kept hid-
den from participants [32]. This allowed the organizers to vary
the ASV system to evaluate robustness of systems. The sec-
ondary metric was equal-error-rate (EER) based on the quality
of the countermeasure alone to predict bona fide versus spoofed.
We selected our best system for submission to the challenge
based on performance with the tDCF metric.
In Table 2 we report our system performance on the devel-
opment set using the signal features, the x-vector features, and
our top features combined. We also report the official results
for our submission on the evaluation set. For reference, we pro-
vide the evaluation performance for both baselines - which used
a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and signal features. They
were: LFCC-GMM [33] and CQCC-GMM [1]. Our system
performed better than the baselines for both metrics on devel-
opment and evaluation sets (to 3-significant digits).
While the x-vectors alone did not distinguish well between
spoofed and bona fide speech, we did find an improvement
when the x-vectors were combined with signal features. Specif-
ically, we found our best feature combination to be SCMC fea-
tures with the scaled LDA x-vectors, xEAs, that jointly modeled
environment and attack variations. The SCMC feature captures
the magnitude of energy a sub-band, which can effectively dis-
tinguish two signals even if they share the same average energy.
The SCMC feature was also one of the best-performing fea-
tures from the analysis in [2] for the ASVspoof 2017 challenge,
though was based on different data. It has been recognized as
a stable feature across experimental conditions. Further experi-
ments on the use of the Gaussian noise layer indicated that using
Development Evaluation
t-DCF EER (%) t-DCF EER (%)
Si
gn
al
Fe
at
ur
es MFCC 0.204 8.35 - -
IMFCC 0.199 7.98 - -
RFCC 0.210 8.58 - -
SCMC 0.209 8.47 - -
LFCC 0.229 8.90 - -
CQCC 0.275 10.9 - -
x-
ve
ct
or
s
xA 0.814 31.5 - -
xE 0.971 41.5 - -
xEA 0.820 31.6 - -
xAs 0.815 31.4 - -
xEs 0.970 41.7 - -
xEAs 0.820 31.9 - -
SCMC+xEAs 0.194 7.74 0.235 9.15
C
om
bo SCMC+xEAs-N 0.225 9.16 - -
IMFCC+xEs 0.197 7.47 - -
MFCC+IMFCC 0.206 7.96 - -
LFCC-GMM 0.255 11.9 0.301 13.5
CQCC-GMM 0.195 9.87 0.245 11.0
Table 2: Our system using different features on the development
set, and the evaluation set for our challenge submission. Two
baselines from the organizers are included last, for reference.
the noise layer (shown by default in Table 2) always performed
better than without it (shown as SCMC+xEAs-N in Table 2).
In our earlier analysis, we had found that differences in the
replay device quality was captured by the x-vectors. When the
replay device quality is very good, or perfect, then it is much
more difficult to develop spoofing countermeasures. While not
reported in this paper, the official detailed performance results
from the ASVspoof 2019 challenge organizers also indicate that
certain attack types are much more difficult, specifically with
the high-quality replay device. That is an important finding for
ASV research and our analysis in this paper also supports it.
A potential limitation of our approach is due to our use
of the tanh activation function for the CNN regression output.
Typically, this activation forces output near the boundaries of -1
and +1, making it more difficult to obtain output scores near the
centerline. An interesting analysis of our system might include
how the output values are situated within the range of -1 and +1
for various attack types and environmental conditions.
As future work, we would also like to experiment with dif-
ferent input features for the x-vector extraction. In this paper,
we used frame-level 40-dim MFCC features, without restricting
the frequency range. We encourage future work to look more
closely at the best frequency range and the best type of frame-
level features to capture differences in the acoustic conditions
of an utterance with these x-vector embeddings. Different nor-
malization techniques could also be investigated.
5. Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the EPSRC Centre for Doc-
toral Training in Data Science, funded by the UK Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council (grant EP/L016427/1)
and the University of Edinburgh. It was also supported by a
PhD studentship from the DataLab Innovation Centre, Ericsson
Media Services, and Quorate Technology. The authors thank:
Erfan Loweimi, Ondrej Klejch, and Joachim Fainberg (CSTR),
and Michael Camilleri (IANC) for their helpful discussions.
6. References
[1] M. Todisco, H. Delgado, and N. Evans, “Constant Q Cepstral Co-
efficients: A Spoofing Countermeasure for Automatic Speaker
Verification,” Computer Speech & Language, vol. 45, pp. 516–
535, 2017.
[2] R. Font and M. J. Cano, “Experimental Analysis of Features for
Replay Attack Detection - Results on the ASVspoof 2017 Chal-
lenge,” in Interspeech, 2017, pp. 7–11.
[3] G. Lavrentyeva, S. Novoselov, E. Malykh, A. Kozlov, O. Kuda-
shev, and V. Shchemelinin, “Audio Replay Attack Detection with
Deep Learning Frameworks,” Interspeech, pp. 82–86, 2017.
[4] ASVspoof 2019: Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing
and Countermeasures Challenge. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.asvspoof.org/
[5] D. Snyder, D. Garcia-Romero, G. Sell, D. Povey, and S. Khudan-
pur, “X-vectors: Robust DNN Embeddings for Speaker Recog-
nition,” in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2018, pp. 5329–
5333.
[6] A. Janicki, F. Alegre, and N. Evans, “An Assessment of Automatic
Speaker Verification Vulnerabilities to Replay Spoofing Attacks,”
Security and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 15, pp. 3030–
3044, 2016.
[7] S. Shiota, F. Villavicencio, J. Yamagishi, N. Ono, I. Echizen, and
T. Matsui, “Voice Liveness Detection Algorithms Based on Pop
Noise Caused by Human Breath for Automatic Speaker Verifica-
tion,” in Sixteenth Annual Conference of the International Speech
Communication Association, 2015.
[8] ——, “Voice Liveness Detection for Speaker Verification Based
on a Tandem SingleDouble Channel Pop Noise Detector,” in Six-
teenth Annual Conference of the International Speech Communi-
cation Association, 2016, pp. 259–263.
[9] L. Blue, L. Vargas, and P. Traynor, “Hello, Is It Me You’re Look-
ing For?: Differentiating Between Human and Electronic Speak-
ers for Voice Interface Security,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM
Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Net-
works. ACM, 2018, pp. 123–133.
[10] C.-I. Lai, A. Abad, K. Richmond, J. Yamagishi, N. Dehak, and
S. King, “Attentive Filtering Networks for Audio Replay Attack
Detection,” in ICASSP 2019-2019 IEEE International Conference
on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE,
2019, pp. 6316–6320.
[11] M. Kamble, H. Tak, and H. Patil, “Effectiveness of Speech
Demodulation-Based Features for Replay Detection,” in Proceed-
ings of Interspeech 2018, 2018, pp. 641–645. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.21437/Interspeech.2018-1675
[12] M. R. Kamble and H. A. Patil, “Analysis of Reverberation via
Teager Energy Features for Replay Spoof Speech Detection,” in
ICASSP 2019-2019 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2019, pp. 2607–
2611.
[13] M. Liu, L. Wang, J. Dang, S. Nakagawa, H. Guan, and X. Li, “Re-
play Attack Detection Using Magnitude and Phase Information
with Attention-Based Adaptive Filters,” in ICASSP 2019-2019
IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2019, pp. 6201–6205.
[14] B. Chettri, S. Mishra, B. L. Sturm, and E. Benetos, “A Study On
Convolutional Neural Network Based End-To-End Replay Anti-
Spoofing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.09164, 2018.
[15] I. Himawan, S. Madikeri, P. Motlicek, M. Cernak, S. Sridha-
ran, and C. Fookes, “Voice Presentation Attack Detection Using
Convolutional Neural Networks,” in Handbook of Biometric Anti-
Spoofing. Springer, 2019, pp. 391–415.
[16] B. Chettri, B. L. Sturm, and E. Benetos, “Analysing Replau Spoof-
ing Countermeasure Performance Under Varied Conditions,” in
2018 IEEE 28th International Workshop on Machine Learning for
Signal Processing (MLSP). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–6.
[17] M. Witkowski, S. Kacprzak, P. Zelasko, and K. Kowalczyk, “Au-
dio Replay Attack Detection Using High-Frequency Features,” In-
terspeech, pp. 82–86, 2017.
[18] P. Nagarsheth, E. Khoury, K. Patil, and M. Garland, “Replay At-
tack Detection Using DNN for Channel Discrimination,” Inter-
speech, pp. 97–101, 2017.
[19] A. Anjos, L. E. Shafey, R. Wallace, M. Gu¨nther, C. McCool, and
S. Marcel, “Bob: A Free Signal Processing and Machine Learning
Toolbox for Researchers,” in 20th ACM Conference on Multime-
dia Systems (ACMMM), Nara, Japan, Oct. 2012.
[20] A. Anjos, M. Gu¨nther, T. de Freitas Pereira, P. Korshunov, A. Mo-
hammadi, and S. Marcel, “Continuously Reproducing Toolchains
in Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning Experiments,” in
International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), Aug.
2017.
[21] E. Jones, T. Oliphant, P. Peterson et al., “SciPy: Open source
scientific tools for Python,” 2001–, [Online; accessed ¡today¿].
[Online]. Available: http://www.scipy.org/
[22] D. Povey, A. Ghoshal, G. Boulianne, L. Burget, O. Glembek,
N. Goel, M. Hannemann, P. Motlicek, Y. Qian, P. Schwarz,
J. Silovsky, G. Stemmer, and K. Vesely, “The Kaldi Speech
Recognition Toolkit,” in IEEE 2011 Workshop on Automatic
Speech Recognition and Understanding. IEEE Signal Processing
Society, Dec. 2011, iEEE Catalog No.: CFP11SRW-USB.
[23] F. Chollet et al., “Keras,” https://keras.io, 2015.
[24] M. Abadi, P. Barham, J. Chen, Z. Chen, A. Davis, J. Dean,
M. Devin, S. Ghemawat, G. Irving, M. Isard et al., “Tensorflow:
A System for Large-Scale Machine Learning,” in 12th USENIX
Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
(OSDI), 2016, pp. 265–283.
[25] S. Dutta, B. Tripp, and G. W. Taylor, “Convolutional Neural Net-
works Regularized by Correlated Noise,” in 2018 15th Conference
on Computer and Robot Vision (CRV). IEEE, 2018, pp. 375–382.
[26] G. An, “The Effects of Adding Noise During Backpropagation
Training on a Generalization Performance,” Neural computation,
vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 643–674, 1996.
[27] C. M. Bishop, “Training With Noise is Equivalent to Tikhonov
Regularization,” Neural Computation, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 108–116,
1995.
[28] A. Y. Ng, “Feature Selection, L1 vs. L2 Regularization, and Ro-
tational Invariance,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-First Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning. ACM, 2004, p. 78.
[29] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep Learning,” Nature,
vol. 521, no. 7553, p. 436, 2015.
[30] L. Prechelt, “Early Stopping - But When?” in Neural Networks:
Tricks of the trade. Springer, 1998, pp. 55–69.
[31] D. Kingma and J. Ba, “Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimiza-
tion,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[32] T. Kinnunen, K. A. Lee, H. Delgado, N. Evans, M. Todisco,
M. Sahidullah, J. Yamagishi, and D. A. Reynolds, “t-DCF: A
Detection Cost Function for the Tandem Assessment of Spoof-
ing Countermeasures and Automatic Speaker Verification,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.09618, 2018.
[33] M. Sahidullah, T. Kinnunen, and C. Hanilc¸i, “A Comparison of
Features for Synthetic Speech Detection,” International Speech
Communication Association (ISCA), 2015.
